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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JANICE C. :MARTIN, Widow, GAY-· 
LYNN MARTIN, MICHELLE 
MART IN, GARY CHAD,VICK 
MARTIN, and VAL JAMES MAR-
TIN.Minors by and through their Guard-
ian Ad Litem, JANCE C. MARTIN,. 
Plaintiffs and Appellants \ Case No. 
'I 182005 
vs. \ 
LYNN D. CHRISTENSEN and 
FARMERS INSURANCE EX-
CHANGE, a California Corporation, ;', 
Defendants and Respondents. 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Plaintiffs, Janice C. Martin et al, appeal from an 
Order granting the defendants' motion for partial Sum-
mary Judgment in the Third Judicial District Court 
of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Stewart M. Hanson presiding. 
l 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs filed a complaint against the defendants 
in the District Court of the Third Judicial District, Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, on the 9th day of Sep-
tember, 1968. After hearing arguments on both plain-
tiffs' and defendants' motions for summary judgment, 
Judge Stewart M. Han.son entered an Order partially 
granting the defendants' motion on the 6th day of No-
vember, 1968. Subsequently, the appellants filed an 
interlocutory appeal pursuant to Rule 72 ( b) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant submits that the Order partially 
granting the defendants' motion for Summary J udg-
ment should be reversed, and an order entered that 
plaintiffs are entitled to the relief prayed for in their 1 
Motion for Summary Judgment as a matter of law. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
At approximately 9 :00 p.m. on or about the Ist , 
day of December, 1967, plaintiff, Janice C. Martin, and 
her now deceased husband, Gary, were pedestrians at 
the Southeast corner of the intersection at 3300 South 
and 500 East Streets, Salt Lake County, Utah. While , 
walking on the sidewalk, the plaintiff and her husband 
were struck by an automobile being driven by def end-
ant, Lynn D. Christensen, an uninsured motorist. 
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As of December 1, 1967, Gary Martin was the 
named insured in two ( 2) insurance policies with De-
endant Carrier namely specified as Nos. 76-6643-02-14 
and 76-6643-00-14, both of which provided coverage 
for uninsured motorists. At the time of his death, Gary 
.Martin was thirty-six ( 36) years of age and had a rea-
sonable life expectancy of another thirty-eight ( 38) 
years; and he was earning approximately Ten Thousand 
Dollars ( $10,000) per year. 
At the hearing on November 6, 1968, arguments 
for Summary Judgment were entered by both plaintiff 
and defendant. The defendant argued that the extent 
of financial liability of the defendant was limited to 
$10,000 for the heirs of Gary Martin, Deceased, and 
$10,000 for injuries to Janice C. Martin. In support 
of its contention the Defendant relief upon Condition 
(7) of PART II, Coverage C, of said insurance poli-
cies, which reads as follows: 
With respect to any occurrence, accident or 
loss to which this and any other insurance policy 
or policies issued to the insured by the Company 
also apply, no payment shall be made hereunder 
which, when added to any amount paid or pay-
able under such other insurance policy or policies, 
would result in a total payment to the insured 
or any other person in excess of the highest ap-
plicable limit of liability under any one such 
policy. 
On the other hand plaintiff argued that the extent 
of financial liability of the Defendant should be found 
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to include up to an amount of $20,000 for the heirs of 
Gary Martin, deceased, and $20,000 for injuries to 
Janice C. Martin for reasons which shall appear herein. 
At the conclusion of the hearing the Court found 
in favor of the defendant's motion upon reasons con-
trary to law and repugnant to public policy. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE INSURER VOLUNTARILY WAIVED 
THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 7 O:F 
PART II ENTITLED "OTHER INSURANCE 
IN THE COMP ANY" BY CONTRACTING 
FOR ADDITIONAL COVERAGE AND AC-
CEPTING A PREMIU.M THEREFOR. 
The insurance policies in question are identical with 
the exception of the description of the vehicles, and the 
dates of issuance. Both policies contained an uninsured 
motorist provision, and a provision limiting liability 
where there was "other insurance." The situation thus 
becomes that Farmers issued a second policy to the 
Martins knowing that the "other insurance" condition 
in the first policy would invalidate the expected coverage 
in the second policy. 
Plaintiff respectfully contends that knowledge of 
the "other insurance" clause on the part of Farmers plus 
acceptance and retention by the company of additional 
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premium payments constitutes a waiver of said clause 
and that the Respondent should be estopped from 
asserting said clause as a defense. See generally 28 
Am. J ur. 2d, Estoppel and Waiver, § 162. Under the 
terms of the first insurance policy, the Appellants wou1a 
have received Twenty Thousand Dollars ( $20,000), 
the exact amount the defendant admits it owes despite 
the existence of a second policy. 
In light of above principles and well-settled no-
tions of equity, the lower court was clearly in error 
in gr an ting the defendant's motion for partial summary 
judgment. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT'S GRANTING OF 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT FRUSTRATES THE 
PURPOSE OF UTAH'S UNINSURED MOTOR-
IST STATUTE. 
Utah Code Ann., 1953, Sec. 41-12-21.1 (1967 Supp.) 
sets out certain minimum requirements automobile in-
surance policies must meet. The requirement under con-
sideration is found in Utah Code Ann., 1953, 41-12-5 
( 1967 Supp.) and reads in part as follows: 
" ... provided, however, every such policy or 
bond is subject, if the accident has resulted in 
bodily injury or death, to a limit, exclusive of 
interests and costs, of not less than $10,000 be-
cause of bodily injury to or death of one person 
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in any one accident and, subject to said limit for 
one person, to a limit of not less than $20,000 be-
cause of bodily injury to or death of two, or more 
persons in any one accident, . . . " 
The obvious intent of the Legislature in enacting 
the Uninsured .Motorist Act was to provide insurance 
to policyholders such as plaintiff .Martin against inade-
quate compernmtion for injuries or death caused by the 
negligence of financially irresponsible motorists. Fur-
thermore, the statute sets out only the minimum require-
ments an insurance policy must meet in this state. The 
statute does not prohibit parties from contracting for 
more insurance coverage if they so desire, and what 1 
better example of additional desired coverage can there 
be than by purchasing a second policy and paying addi-
tional premiums? 
The plaintiff is seeking to recover only the amount 
stated in each policy which is the minimum amount of 
coverage required by state law for bodily injury to, or 
death of, two or more persons in any one accident. 
A case almost exactly in point is the case of Robey 
v. Safeco Insurance Company of America, 270 F. Supp. 
473 (D. Ark. 1967). In Robey the defendant had 
issued to plaintiff two insurance policies on two differ· 
ent cars.Judge John E. Miller had before him the ques· 
tions of the legal effect of the "other insurance" clauses 
in the two policies issued by Safeco. Both of the policies . 
contained an uninsured motorist provision, and a pro-
vision limiting liability where there was "other insur· .. 
ance. 
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Judge Miller held: 
"The 'other insurance' provision in the Safeco 
policies are not applicable with respect to each 
other. The contention of the defendant that its 
liability shoudl be pro-rated between the two 
policies is invalid." 
Thus, the court held that the liability of the de-
fendant was the sum of the minimum amounts required 
by state law under both policies. In essence the court 
held in the Robey case that the legislative intent as ex-
pressed in the Uninsured Motorist Act required the 
insurer to give the stated coverage in each policy regard-
less of the "other insurance" provisions found in the two 
Safeco policies issued to the plaintiff. 
It should also be noted that the Arkansas statute 
is practically identical with the Utah act. See Ark. Stat. 
Ann. Sec. 66-4003 (1966 Repl.) and Sec. 75-1427 
( 1965 Supp.). This latter section provides that no policy 
or bond shall be effective: 
" . . . unless issued by an insurance company 
or surety company authorized to do business in 
this State ... unless such policy or bond is sub-
ject, if the accident has resulted in bodily injury 
or death, to a limit, exclusive of interests and 
costs, of not less than $10,000 because of bodily 
injury to or death of one (I) person in any one 
(I) accident and subject to said limit for one 
(I) person, to a limit of not less than $20,000 
because of bodily injury to or death of two (2) 
or more persons in any one (I) ac~ident . " 
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In other words, the court in Robey said the effect 
of the issuance of the second policy which also contained 
the uninsured motorist clauses was to provide the plain-
tiff coverage of $20,000/$40,000 for uninsured motorist 
protection despite the presence of "other insurance" 
clauses in both policies. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons plaintiff respectfully 
submits that this Court determine that the lower court 
should have rejected defendant's motion for summary 
judgment because the ruling was contrary to principles 
of equity; was contrary to judicial precedent; and 
which, if allowed to stand, would frustrate the expressed 
legislative intent embodied in the Utah Uninsured Mo-
torists Act. ~ 
This court should ~ ~ decision of the lower 
court and remand the case back to the District Court 
for relief in accordance herewith. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LOUIS M. HAYNIE 
KENTT. YANO 
Attorneys for Appellants 
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